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Waiver by a Servant of the Masters Statutory Duty.
The case of Simpson v N. Y. Rubber Co. raised a question which
was not only novel, but extremely interesting. Whether a servant
by continuing in a certain employment with knowledge of the dan-
gerous character of machinery used on the prmises, and with fur-
ther knowledge of his master's neglect or omission to erect cer-
tain safeguards about such machinery, as he was by statute requir-
ed to do, could waive the duty of the master and in case of acci-
dent or injury to hims6If bar his right of recovery against the
employer was the question to be adjudicated.
Prior to the case of Simpson v N. Y. Rubber Co. reported in
30 N. Y. Supp. 339, the above question, in this precise form,
stripped of any other influential circumstances, had not been rais-
ed for adjudication before the courts of this State, and in most
of the decisions which seem to settle this question, it will be
found upon close examination that although the question was rais-
ed in course of the litigation, still the cases were decided upon
other points materially different than the question here discuss-
ed and what appeared , in the opinion to touch upon the question
in hand will be discovered to be nothing more than dictum. The
facts and circumstances in the case of George L. Simpson v New
York Rubber Co. were as follows:- Simpson was employed by the do-
fendent rubber company in its factory in the town of Fishkill.
His ordinary work ilace was on the first or ground floor, and his
work was the cutting of rubber by hand with a knife, but it was
also part of his work to go to the basement which was on the floor
below, and Cet stock and wheel it on a truck across the basement
floor to the elevator, and then take it by elevator to the first
floor, for use. On the day of the accident, he was engaged in
doing his work in the usual manner, lie and the other workmen
were accustomed to wheel their empty truca,s across an operating
shaft which ran parallel with the floor, about two inches above
it. On one side of the passage crossed by the shaft was the
machinery against which the plaintiff fell, the saine being entire-
ly uncovered and unprotect6d, and unsurrounded by proper guards as
required by the statute. The plaintiff Simpson, on the day of
the accident, was going from the floor above to the basement to
get stock, and while attempting to wheel the empty truck across
the shaft, he slipped and fell against the unprotected machinery
in such a manner that his right arm was cought therein and severe-
ly injured.
This action was based on Chapter 673, Laws of 1892, Sec-
tion 8 of which reads as follows:
" Section 8.- It shall be the
duty of the owner of any nanufactoring establishment, or his
agents, superintendents or other person in charge of the same, to
furnish and supply, or cause to be furnished and supplied there-
in, in the discretion of the factory inspetor, or of the assist-
ant factory inspector, or of a deputy factory inspector, unless
disapproved by the factory inspector, where maehinery is used,
belt shifters or other safe mechanical contrivances, for the pur-
pose of throwing off or on belts or pulleys; and wherever possible
machinery therein shall be provided with loose pulleys; all vats,
pans,saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set screws
and machinery of every description therein shall be properly
guarded, and no person shall remove or make ineffective any safe-
guard around or attached to any planer, saw, belting, shafting,
or other machinery, or around any vat or pan, while the same is
in use: unless for the purpose of imnediately making repairs there
to, and all such safeguards shall be promptly replaced. BI at-
taching a notice thereto to that effect, the use of any machinery
may be prohibited by the factory inspector, assistant factory in-
spector or by a deputy factory inspector, unless such notice is
disapproved by the factory inspector, should such machinery be re-
garded as dangerous. Such notice must be signed by the inspector
who issues it, and shall only be removed after the required safe-
guards are provided, and the unsafe or dangerous machine shall
not be used in the meantime. Exhaust fans of sufficient power
shall be provided for the purpose of carrying off dust from emery
wheels and grindstones and dust-creating machinery therein. No
person under eighteen years of age and no woman under twenty-one
years of age shall be allowed to clean machinery while in motion".
The complaint expressly charges neglect to comply with this
Statute.
The Statute in addition recites that any fpilure to comply
with its provisions, or any act in violation of its requirements
shall be a misdemeanor, and inflicts a punishment of fine and im-
prisonment. The action was tried at Circuit Court on the 5th
of October 1893 and judgment for 5000. was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff Simpson. After the introduction of all the evidence
the counsel for the defendent moved for a nonsuit which the Court
denied, and the defendent appoaled to the General Term of the Sup-
reme Court where the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
The argument of the defendent and appellant at the General Term
consisted as follows:- It was first urged that the plaintiff's
right to recover rests entirely upon proof as to the condition of
the machinery, and the defendent seeks primarily to absolve itself
from liability on the contention that the plaintiff's ability to
recover is barred by the rule of law that a servant assiues all
risks obvious and incident to the employment, which rule it is
claimed is controlling against the right to succeed. It is fur-
thermore said that this rule permits the employer to select mach-
inery such as is satisfactory to himself and which in his opinion
is suited to the uses to which it is to be subjected, and that if
a servant enters into the employment or remirains therein with full
knowledge of the character and condition of the machinery used on
the premises, he voluntarily assumes the risks arising therefrom,
Much stress was laid upon this argument and the overwhelming list
of authorities which announced this rule would upon first reading
tend to convince one that it was unquestionable and insuperable.
The law apilicable to duties of masters to their servants and em-
ployees might well be reviewed here in order that analogies may
be more clearly drawn. That when a person entered into the em-
ployment of another, he assumed all risks obvious and incidental
to the employment, is a proposition that was long ago announced
by the courts of almost every civilized country, and has been app-
lied by the courts time and again until at present the cases in
which this question has been adjudicated are almost innnnerable(a)
From the list of authorities just cited, the firmness with
which this rule has been held by the courts, will be seen with
little difficulty. The rule is comprehensively laid down in the
case of Sweeney v Berlin & Jones Envelope Co. 101 N. Y.520 and
(a) Gibson v Erie Railway Co., 63 N. Y. 449.
Sweeney v Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., 101 N. Y. 520.
Hickey v Taffee, 105 N. Y. 26.
Cahillv Hilton, 106 N. Y. 53I2.
Stringha, v Hilton, III N. Y. i88.
Bohn v Hevemeyer, 114 N. Y. 296.
Also cases cItod under each of the above cases.
reads as follows:-
"A servant accepts the service, subject to the
risks incident to it: and where, wher he enters into the employ-
ment, the machinery and implements used in the master's business
are of a certain kind or condition, and the servant knows it, he
voluntarily takes the risks resulting from their use". The
reason and justice upon which the above rule stands are too well
known and for our purposes need not be considered here. For the
safety and protection of the servant and also in reciprocation of
the risks imposed upon the workman, the common law imputes to the
employer certain duties, and requires him to supply certain safe-
guards and a breach of these duties or an omission to provide
such protection, resulting in injury to the employed, will, in
cases where the injured person was free from contributory negli-
gence, and had no knowledge of these misdoings of his master, or
if he did not expressly or impliedly waive these duties of the
person engaging him, will make the neglectful employer responsible
in damages to his injured servant.
Necessity and public policy are the grounds upon which these
duties are imputed to the master and for a breach thereof, it is
strictly equitable that he should respond in damages to the party
afflicted. The law has seer. fit to impose upon the master the
duty of furnishing his servant with a reasonably safe place in
which he can carry on his work and in addition to this duty the
following others; he must furnish a sufficient number of compe-
tent fullow workinen, reasonable rules and regulations, tools which
are reasonably safe for the use of the workmen, and reasonable
instruction and information. When the master has furnished these
and a servant sustains an injury, the loss must lie where it falls
and the law which required the performance of the above specified
duties by the master leaves him free from liability. The master
has done all that he is legally required to do and has thus in-
voked the protection of the law which will not be denied him.
But on the other hand, should the master or employer, by ne-
glect or omission fail to provide these enumerated safeguards re-
quired by the law, thereby increasing the risk which the servant
is by law presumed to accept on entrance into the service, and in
consequence of his failure to so provide, the servant suffers harm
to his person, the legal protection shifts from the master to the
servant and a remedy co-extensive with the damage is allowed to
the injured employee.
To cover the above rules in a few words, we may say that if
the mastor provides the five requisitos already mentioned, he is
in all cases absolved from liability, but if he fails to do so,
the servant is permitted to recover providing no other qualifying
circumstances exist.
Now as to qualifying circmistances, if any there may be. Let
us suppose that a man enters a factory as operator of machinery
used for manufactoring purposes. lie Is in and about the premises
each day attending to his work. While operating the machinery,
he discovers that it is out of repair or otherwise unsafe and dan-
gerous to use. The master meanwhile, although required by law
to put such machinery into a reasonably safe condition, has no
knowledge of the fact that the machinery has fallen into disrepair
and has become dangerous to use and as a natural result, the un-
secure condition of the machinery unaltered remains. The servant
knowing well that it is at least negligent to use the machinery
while in such a condition, nevertheless continues to operate it
until finally a severe injury befalls hir4. What then is the just
and equitable rule in such a case? The law weighing the facts
and circunstances without prejudice and with a strict regard for
fairness and public policy, says to the servant, it is time that
you are badly injured and thPt the injury would not have befallen
you had your employer furnished you with such machinery as he was
by law required, still you were well aware of his omission and
as a man possessing an ordinary amount of care and prudence, you
should have forseen that a continued use of complicated machinery
which had fallen into disrepair would naturally and probably re-
sult in some injury to you, and therefore although probably there
was an omission on the part of your master, still your right to
proceed against him is barred upon the following grounds: first,
that you consented to your injury thus making your conduct the
proximate cause of your injury, and secondly, by your continuance
in the employnent you tacitly permitted the master to dispense
with furnishing a better condition of machinery. You, by your
silence, intimated that you were satisfied.
At common law the servant would without doubt be barred and
he would be deemed to have waived his master's duty. In the
case of Thompson v N. Y. Rubber Co., existed one fact which fur-
nished a basis for the plaintiff in the case to stand upon. It
was this. In addition to the five duties incumbent upon the
master which were heretofore eniuierated, the legislature of the
State of New York added another, namely, that (according to the
terraof the statute herein given at length) the master should
place certain guards around exposed cogs and gearings. Under
the law as announced by the courts, the fivefold duty of the mas-
ter to his servant were imposed as natural demands of necessity
and public policy. The courts required of the master the reason-
able performance of these duties and did not dictate that they
should be performed in this way or that. For example, they re-
quired that the master should furnish a reasonable numbor of com-
petent fellow workmen and this was presumed to have been done un-
til it was shown to be otherwise. As each case arose the court
from the facts and circnnmstances, draws its inferences as to
whether the master had discharged his duties or not. Although
the courts declared that machinery should be reasonably safe, stil
they prescribed no means which the master should employ in making
it so. So long as the machin]ery was to a reasonable extent safe
the requirements of the law romainod fulfilled. According to
the construction given to the statute, its terms must be complied
with literally; whether the machinery is reasonably safe or not,
is not to be considered, but unless the machinery is guarded in
the manner T-rescribed, the master's liability becomes absolute.
In the Simpson case, the machinery had been in use for some thirty
years during which time, it was operated with perfect safety and
without injury to the employees of the mill. It was -rominently
located, of large dimensions and plainly open to view. It was
not like a trap set in some obscure part of the mill which one
might fall against without warning, but on the contrary was as
openly visible as any machinery could be and it is doubtful
whether any injury might have been rendered possible save for the
existence of some extraordinary cirumstances or some negligent
conduct on the -art of the one sustaining the injury. The plain-
tiff in this case was hiraself employed in the mill, for a period
of two years preceding the accident and was well acquainted with
the location, condition and character of the machinery which
occasioned his injury. lie had worked in its vicinity and around
it and passed and re-passed it several times daily. The injury
which he received followed an accidental slipping and but for the
occurrence of this unfcrseer accident, no injury would have been
inflicted by reason of the unguarded machinery upon which he cas-
ually fell.
That, at common law, independont of any statute, the machinery
was reasonably safe, is not disputed but although reasonably
safe, the omission to provide the boxings specified in the statute,
made the employer's liability as extensive as if under the co=,on
law he had left the machinery in a condition of disrepair and im-
minent danger to those in its vicinity. When the courts announc-
ed the well settled doctrine regarding the acceptance by the ser-
vant of the risks incident to the employment, many years ago, and
also the doctrine relative to the master's duty to his servant,
the ends which they sought to attain were as follows. Under the
rule first mentioned the courts clearly intended to protect the
employer from innumerable actions for damages alleged to have
been caused in consequence of his neglect or inadvertance. This
rule was founded upon the reasoning that, the eml.loyee stood in
a much better attitude to observe the condition of his tools and
implements of work, and that for him to continue to use tolls
which were, in consequence of inferiority of make or construction,
or because of their condition of disrepair, unsafe and hazardous
to continue to use, was negligence, .and he was by such conduct
deemed to have contributed to his injury.
In order that the lives of persons of employees should not
be placed in constant danger and peril, and for the protection
of servants did the courts, many years in the past promulgate the
rules which devolved upon the master the duty of providing reason-
able protection for those who are in his cmploy. These duties
were laid upon th&L master in part, to counteract such bad results
as might ensue from limiting the right of the servant to recover,
to those cases where his injury was occasioned by some neglect
on the part of the master in the absence of waiver or contrib-
utory negligence, and furthermore for the purpose of limiting the
risk which careless employees would be inclined to take. If the
rules were otherwise, gieat injustice and hardship would contin-
ually follow. To require the employer to furnish such articles
as are in each particular case reasonably safe and secure to the
workman, leaves for the workman a risk which is relatively and
comparatively small. An injury falling upon the servant after
the performance by the master of' his legal duty, can only be
possible in the following instances: either by some fault or neg-
ligence on the servant's part contributing to the injury or by a
condition of machinery etc. reasonably safe in their nature, or
by some inevitable accident. In either of which cases, a law
holding the mastdr liable would be manifestly unjust and inequit-
able. in the first case because the injury was inflicted by the
hand of the servant himself and in the second and third cases be-
cause neither was to blame, and in consequence the loss must re-
main where it fell.
Thus it will be observed that the main defense of the
defendent in this case was that of contributory negligence
amounting te a waiver of dlity. In addition to the argumonts
here given 'r. Thomas Boven in his admirable treatise on
the Principles of the Law of Negligence lays down the follow-
ing rules of law as being applicable to the statement of
facts herein. "That a yerson guilty of contributory negli-
gence should not recover even when the injury arises from a
neglect to observe a statutory duty is not only reasonable but
clear law. For in such a case the plaintiff has failed to
establish the Proposition on which alone he is entitled to
recover damages that the injury happened through the defendent
negligence=! Continuing he says "Where the rLaster is under a
etatutory liability to take p;recautiens, the pres-nnptin of
law is that as between tha master and the workmen working in
the absence of statutory safeguards the master is not dis -
charged but.this can be rebutted by clear proof of an under-
taking of the employment by the worknen with knwledge of
the risk involved. Thus laying dorn a train of reasoning
similar to that used by the defendent in this case.,the a
The argument of the defendent closed as follows the
counsel urged that as the obligations iiiose upon the hm-
plyer bth by coim on law n bV statute were for the benefit
and protection of the servant, he could with adequate, con-
sistency and regard for public policy waive either for tho
result in both cases would be siroilar.
On the part of the plaintiff the following argument
was offered. That the statute horeinbefore ruientilned was
mandatory and could under no circumstances be waived by any
act of an em1leyee: and also tc -,ermit the waiver of a duty
imposed by the Legislature was in contravention of public
policy and consequently invelid. The plaintiff denied the
allegation of centributory negligence and claimed that he
fell upon the machinery in oansequence of an accident which
as to him was unavoidable.
It was no deubt the intenticn rof the Legislature that
the letter of the statute should be complied with and any
deviation therefrom was intended to impute a liability to
the person so violating it which was to be absolute and iun-
affected by any attending circiuaistances and the ceurt finds
Justification for its holding by deciding the case according
to the intention of the framers of the statute. But with
regard to the groumd of public policy upon which the desioion
was partly based there is amnple roam for doubt as to its
comparative soundness.
Why the waiver of a statutory duty, na;-cly the boxing
of certain cegs,gearings etc, is any nerore '§osed to pubtic
policy, than the waivor oz tho -1.ty of the i- aster to pro-
vide a competent njuber of fellow werknen I cannot see for
in case of the waiver of statutory or legislative duty, or
common law or court imposed duty, the result is the sene.
Furthernore the imposition of a penalty recited in the stat-
ute seems to be a sufficient -inmishmuent for its violation in
consideration of the circuimstances cf facts amounting to wai-
ver and contributory negligence which ouli have existed at c
aernm on law-
In conclusion, I offer the opinion rendered by Judge
Cullen at a General Tear of the Supreme Clurt:-
*The serious question in the case, is the waiver by the
plaintiff of the requirements of the statute. The learned
judge was asled to chsrg. thEt if the defendent failed to
properly guard the shaft and cog wheel, and the plaintiff knew
it and still continued in defendent's employ, he waived the
provision of the statute in that regard, and assumed such ob-
vious risks as w-ere incident to the use of the machinery in
that condition. This te , refu'v, - i the defendent ex-
cepted. This request and refusal fairly raises the questiom.
The general rule settled Icy authority is '1 A servant
Oaccepts the service sfoject to ti-i risks incident to it and
"where, when ho' entrs in the epi-oynent, th,! ahis,,'y aiid
"irplements used in tlie i'sttr's business arc of a certain
kind and condition, and the ",, :nows it, he voluntarily
assmes the risk resulting from their use ,. can ake no
"claim uon the master to furnish other or different safe-
"guards. 11
"Dut the question '-r sonted in this case is a different
one. The statute has enacted that, certain ,_afouards shall
be had for te security of om-lloyees of the factory. The
failure to provide these statutory safe-guards is criminal.
It is doubtless true that parttb s can waive statutory pro-
visions for their benefit and can even rake law for themselves
which the courts are bound to adLinister, -Provided there is
no question of public policy involved.
"tBut is there no question of public policy involved here?
To our mind there is, and that -ublic policy should induce us
to hold, unless ? contrary doctrine is settled by authority,
that the statutcry protection cannot be waived. Our notion
of government has confined State interferehce with the free-
dom of individual action within narrow iinits, but such inter-
ference has never been wholly prohibited. Ex-ierience s has
shown that in some matters persons n.rust be !1rotected from
their own imprudence. If t.ere were to be considered only
tbe interests of thio indivi Ptl in his -ersonal security, the
statute would be rnnocess:ry. Th. ond sought to 10 accom-
plished could equally well be secured by contract with the
employer and the employee. The ',atter has always been a
subject of contract that is no law has ever forbid employees
making the guarding of machinery a :onition of their service.
Yet such contracts are unknown. if, therefore, assent can
dispense with the statutory p)rotection, the subject for prac-
tical purposes is left in the same condition as it was defore
the enactment of the statute.
"But the State has great interest in the protection of!
its members, and this even of the most utilitarian character.
In the case of a maimed employee, he and his family are
likely to become a public charge; the same is true of the
fanmily of an employee killed. The commrunity would seem to
have as much interest in the property of the life and limbs
of a member of it, as in the question whether he should pay
8 per cent. or 0 per cent. interest. Yet by no means which
buman wit can devise can ho nake a valid contract to pay more
than 6 per cent. in this State. The doctrine of waiver or
contributory negligence under this statute is but the equiv-
alent of the contention "in pari delictu" under the usury
statute, a claim always repudiated by the courts. lWo admit
that the torims of the usury law differ from those of the
statute under consideration. But the present form of the
usury law is Siimply the result of a long Strife between the
legislature and the courts, the latter trying to avoid the
effect of the legislature, a strife in rhich thul legislature
eventually proved victorious . Ior is tho logislation un-
der discussion analogous. At the present time there seems
to be a tendency to reaction in tho docyrine of non-inter-
ference. Within a few years the State has prescribed the
'prices to be paid for elevating grain in the port of New York,
by private iaiividuals who possess no franchises hor even
special facilities for the business. Yet this legislation
is held valid both by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
